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Abstract
We undertake a fundamental study of network equilibria modeled as solutions of fixed point of monotone
linear functions with saturation nonlinearities. The considered model extends one originally proposed to study
systemic risk in networks of financial institutions interconnected by mutual obligations and is one of the simplest
continuous models accounting for shock propagation phenomena and cascading failure effects. We first derive explicit
expressions for network equilibria and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for their uniqueness encompassing
and generalizing several results in the literature. Then, we study jump discontinuities of the network equilibria
when the exogenous flows cross a certain critical region consisting of the union of finitely many linear submanifolds
of co-dimension 1. This is of particular interest in the financial systems context, as it shows that even small shocks
affecting the values of the assets of few nodes, can trigger catastrophic aggregated loss to the system and cause the
default of several agents.
1 Introduction
The ability to predict and optimize the behavior of complex socio-technical systems is one of this century’s main
scientific themes. It is becoming clearer and clearer how the behavior of large-scale infrastructural, social, economic,
and financial networks can have a huge societal impact, e.g., enabling or limiting access to essential services, such
as mobility and energy, influencing the outcome of elections, or destabilizing entire economies. A central aspect of
such network systems is the role played by interconnections in amplifying and propagating shocks through cascading
mechanisms that may increase the fragility of a system [1, 2, 3, 4]. The term systemic risk refers to the possibility that
even small shocks localized in a limited part of the network can propagate and amplify through cascading mechanisms,
thus possibly achieving a significant global impact [5, 6, 7, 8].
In this realm, a central problem is to find adequate models for networks, that are sufficiently elaborate to incorporate
such propagation phenomena, yet simple enough to allow for mathematical tractability. Simple contagion models such
as epidemic contact models prove inadequate as based on purely pairwise interactions. A more complex model taking
into account cumulative neighborhood effects is the linear threshold model [9, 10, 11] whose applicability is however
limited by the fact that states of the nodes are described by pure binary variables simply expressing whether the
node has been affected by the shock. In most of the applicative contexts where the network represents a physical
infrastructure or an interconnected financial system, this simplification is way too strong. Indeed, in these cases, the
cascading mechanism is rather triggered by a process naturally working with continuous variables such as, e.g., power
flows in electric grids, traffic volumes in transportation systems, or assets values and payments in financial networks.
In this paper, we undertake a fundamental study of a model, originally proposed in the seminal work [12] to study
systemic risk in networks of financial institutions interconnected by mutual obligations. It is one of the simplest
continuous models where the shock propagation phenomena are caused by a saturation nonlinearity of a positive linear
static system. Precisely, we consider the following fixed point equation
xi = min

max


n∑
j=1
xjPji + ci, 0

 , wi

 , i = 1, . . . , n , (1)
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where P is a row-stochastic or sub-stochastic n× n matrix and w ∈ Rn is a nonnegative vector that jointly describe a
network and where c ∈ Rn is an exogenous flow vector. Equation (1) can be more compactly rewritten as
x = Sw0 (P
′x+ c) . (2)
where Sw0 denotes the vector saturation function
(Sw0 (x))i = min{max{xi, 0}, wi}, i = 1, . . . , n , (3)
We shall refer to vectors x that are solutions of (2) as equilibria of the network (P,w) with exogenous flow c. While
standard arguments guarantee existence of such network equilibria, their uniqueness and dependence on the exogenous
flows prove to be more delicate issues that will be the object of this paper.
In financial networks [12], the entries of the vector w represent the obligations of the various institutions (say banks),
those of the exogenous flow c represent the balance between assets possessed by the entities and their obligations
towards institutions outside the network, while P describes the way obligations of an entity are split among the others
and describe the way the financial system is interconnected. An equilibrium x represents, in this context, a set of
payments that clear the network in a consistent way. Previous works including [13, 7, 14, 15] have analyzed conditions
for uniqueness of the clearing payment x and studied its dependence on the exogenous flow vector c. Their main
focus is to understand the extent to which a shock hitting the value of the assets of a single node i (perturbation of
ci) reflects on the entire network and leads to possible cascade effects. More precisely, they define the concept of a
default node as one for which the quantity
∑
j Pjixj + ci (representing the liquidity of the entity i) is below the value
of its obligation wi and distinguishing in partial or total default if, respectively,
∑
j Pjixj + ci > 0 or not. Although
simple, this framework turns out to be very useful for analyzing how losses propagate through the financial system.
Considering the importance of this application, we will discuss the financial model more accurately in Section 2.1.
Network equilibria defined as fixed points of equation (1) can also be seen as the Nash equilibria of a properly defined
quadratic games —as illustrated in Section 2.2— as well as the equilibrium points of a dynamical flow network with
exogenous flows and capacity constraints that is briefly discussed in Section 2.3 and whose dynamical behavior has
been analyzed in detail in [16].
The present paper presents a systematic study of the equilibria described by equation (2) and gives four fundamental
contributions:
(i) We prove that the set of nodes in partial or full default (in the financial jargon discussed above) is invariant
through the set of all equilibria.
(ii) We analyze the structure of the solutions with respect to the topological properties of the graph. In particular
we show how to effectively construct all equilibria starting from anyone of them.
(iii) We prove a general result that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium, which
subsumes the other theorems assessing uniqueness present in literature. In particular, in the case of a strongly
connected network, conditions for uniqueness can be easily checked a priori without doing any preliminary
computation.
(iv) We show that the equilibrium exhibits a jump discontinuity with respect to the exogenous flow vector c when this
is crossing certain linear sub-manifolds where uniqueness of equilibrium is lost. This is of particular interest in
the financial context, as it shows that even small shocks affecting the values of the assets of few nodes, can trigger
catastrophic aggregated loss to the system and cause the default of several agents. We provide an analytical
description of the discontinuity set and we quantify the size of the jump for an aggregated loss function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this Introduction is devoted to a discussion of some
related literature as well as a brief explanation of the notational conventions to be followed throughout the paper.
Section 2 is devoted to present three motivating examples for the model considered in the paper. Section 3 is devoted
to establishing a number of preliminary results on the structure of the equilibria. Uniqueness results as well a general
expression describing all solutions in non uniqueness cases is presented in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis
of jump discontinuities in the equilibrium with respect to variation of the exogenous flow vector. The papers ends with
Section 6 dedicated to draw some conclusions and open problems.
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1.1 Related Literature
The seminal work by Eisenberg and Noe [12] triggered the development of a large literature on similar models. Ren
et al. [15] explore several conditions on the uniqueness of the clearing payment vector. It is shown that the clearing
payment vector is, in general, not unique, but rather a certain kind of net value of a bank is. Liu and Statum [13] use
linear programming to provide a sensitivity analysis of Eisenberg and Noe model with respect to certain parameters.
Elsinger et al. [17] use the Eisenberg and Noe model together with standard tools from modern risk management to
assess systemic financial stability of the Austrian banking system; they find that financial contagion is rare but can
nonetheless wipe out a major part of the banking system. Cifuentes et al. [18] extend the original Eisenberg and
Noe model by considering fire sales; Rogers et al [19] include bankruptcy costs using a recovery function that drops
discontinuously at the default boundary and then decreases linearly with the amount of assets available. Elsinger and
Helmut [20] enrich the original model by considering cross-holdings that lead to additional spillover effects when a
shock hits the network. Glasserman and Young [14] estimate the extent to which interconnections increase expected
losses and defaults under a wide range of shock distributions and they provide bounds on the potential magnitude of
network effects on contagion and loss amplification; they also provide an extensive survey on the financial networks
topic in [21]. Acemoglu et al. [8] develop a unified framework for the study of how network interactions can function
as a mechanism for propagation and amplification of microeconomic shocks while in [7] they provide an analysis of a
particular case of the Eisenberg and Noe model and they prove some rigorous results about the resilience of different
network topologies depending on the shock magnitude.
1.2 Notation
We briefly explain the notation to be used throughout this paper. We denote vectors with lower case and matrices with
upper case. Sets are denoted with calligraphic letters. A subscript associated to vectors, for instance vA, represents
the sub-vector that is the restriction of v ∈ Rn over the indexes contained in the set A ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The same
notation holds for matrices: PAB represents the sub-matrix of P obtained by considering rows and columns associated
to the indexes contained in sets A and B, respectively. We indicate with 1 the all-1 vector (independently from its
dimension). We consider on Rn the partial order given by entry-wise ordering: if x, y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi for every i
and we use the strict inequality symbol < if moreover the two vectors are different. Throughout the paper the ordering
of vectors will be meant in this sense.
A non-negative matrix P ∈ Rn×n+ is called (row) sub-stochastic if the sum of the elements in each row never exceeds
1, namely P1 ≤ 1. Notice that in the literature it is often assumed that sub-stochastic matrices have the additional
property that for at least one row there is strict inequality. Here we prefer not to follow this convention and in this
way our class of sub-stochastic matrices contains also the stochastic matrices that are those for which P1 = 1.
2 Three applications
In this section, we describe three motivating applications. We start in Section 2.1 by presenting a model of financial
networks generalizing the one first considered in [12]. We then provide an interpretation in terms of Nash equilibria
of a certain quadratic game, as explained in Section 2.2. Finally, in Section 2.3 we discuss a dynamical flow network
model with fixed routing and capacity constraints whose rest points coincide with the equilibria.
2.1 Payment equilibria in financial networks
We consider a set V = {1, . . . , n} of financial entities (e.g., banks, broke dealers,...) interconnected by internal and
external obligations that are specified by a non-negative matrix W ∈ Rn×n and three vectors a, b, u ∈ Rn+ that have
the following interpretations:
• Wij ≥ 0 is the liability of node i to node j;
• ai is the total value of assets and credits of i from external entities;
• bi is the total liability of node i to external non-financial entities;
• ui is the total liability of node i to external financial entities.
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The quantity vi =
∑
j Wji −
∑
j Wij + ai − bi − ui is the net worth of node i. If the condition vi ≥ 0 is verified for
every i ∈ V , it means that each node is fully liable and in principle capable to pay back all its liabilities to the nodes
in the network as well the external ones. In case when instead some nodes do not satisfy the condition vi ≥ 0, namely
they are not fully liable, it is necessary to determine a consistent set of payments among the various nodes.
Put wi =
∑
j Wij + ui and
Pij =
{
Wij/wi ifwi > 0
0 otherwise
We define by Xij the payment from node i to node j and by Xio the payment from node i to external financial entities.
Assuming that liabilities to non-financial entities have a higher seniority and that all other payments (including those
to external financial entities) should be proportional to the corresponding liabilities, a consistent set of payments
among the nodes has to satisfy the relations
Xij = min {Pij max {
∑
kXki + ai − bi, 0} ,Wij}
Xio = min {ui/wimax {
∑
kXki + ai − bi, 0} , ui}
(4)
Let xi =
∑
j Xij +Xio be the total payment of node i to the financial entities. Summing the relations in (4) and using
the fact that Wij = wiPij , we obtain
xi = min
{
max
{∑
k
Xki + ai − bi, 0
}
, wi
}
(5)
so that, Xij = xiPij . Relation (5) can thus be rewritten as
xi = min
{
max
{∑
k
xkPki + ai − bi, 0
}
, wi
}
(6)
This set of relations is equivalent to (4). Indeed, if the vector x solves (6), then Xij = xiPij solves (4). This coincides
with (1) with exogenous flow c = a− b.
Notice that the matrix P is sub-stochastic in its strict sense (i.e., at least one row does not sum to 1) when either
there exist nodes with a positive liability towards external financial entities, or nodes with no financial liabilities.
In this financial setting, it is often considered the case when we start from a fully liable configuration, that is vi ≥ 0
for all i, leading to a solution x of (6) such that xi ≥ wi for all i. We then assume that the outside assets suffer a
shock ǫ ∈ Rn+ so that their values reduce to a− ǫ possibly making some of the vi’s negative. The study of the amount
of nodes in default xi < wi has a function of the shock ǫ is one of the key issues.
2.2 A quadratic network game
Consider a quadratic network game with player set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} where each player i chooses her action Xi· =
(Xi0, Xi1, . . . , Xin) ∈ R
n+1
+ so as to maximize her utility
ui(X) = −
∑
j∈{0,...,n}:
Wij>0
Wij
2
(
Xij
Wij
− 1
)2
, (7)
under the following constraints:
n∑
j=0
Xij ≤
n∑
j=1
Xji + ci . (8)
Above, W ∈ Rn×n+ is a nonnegative zero-diagonal matrix such that wi =
∑n
j=0 Wij > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, c ∈ R
n is a
given vector, and X ∈ R
(n−1)×n
+ denotes the configuration of all players’ actions.
Note that the best response of player i necessarily assignsXij = 0 for every j = 0, . . . , n whenever
∑n
j=1Xji+ci ≤ 0
and Xij = Wij for every j = 0, . . . , n whenever
∑n
j=1 Xji+ ci ≥ wi. On the other hand, when 0 <
∑n
j=1 Xji+ ci < wi,
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then the constraint (8) is met with equality by the best response of a player i and this can then be determined by
setting to 0 the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian
∑
j∈{0,...,n}:
Wij>0
Wij
2
(
Xij
Wij
− 1
)2
+ λ

 n∑
j=0
Xij −
n∑
j=1
Xji − ci

 .
We thus get
Xij = Pij
(
n∑
k=1
Xki + ci
)
, 0 ≤ j ≤ n ,
where
Pij =
Wij
wi
, 0 ≤ i ≤ n , 1 ≤ j ≤ n .
Putting together our findings in the three cases, the best response of a player i = 1, . . . , n reads
Xij = PijS
wi
0
(
n∑
k=1
Xki + ci
)
, 0 ≤ j ≤ n .
The Nash equilibria of this game are those X∗ ∈ R
n×(n+1)
+ with entries X
∗
ij = xiPij , where x = X
∗
1 is a solution of
(2).
2.3 Dynamical flow networks with finite capacities and losses
Consider a dynamical flow network consisting of finitely many cells i = 1, 2, . . . , n, each containing a quantity xi(t) of
the same commodity at time t ≥ 0. The state of the system is described by the vector x(t) = (xi(t))1≤i≤n and evolves
in continuous time as the cells can exchange flow both among themselves and with the external environment. The
network flow dynamics is then described by the system of ordinary differential equations
x˙i = fi(x) , i = 1, . . . , n , (9)
where fi(x) represents the total instantaneous net flow (inflow minus outflow) on the cell i. The form of the instanta-
neous flow fi(x) follows from the considerations below:
• The instantaneous outflow from cell i is exactly xi. A constant fraction Pij ≥ 0 of the quantity of commodity
xi flows directly towards another cell j 6= i in the network, while the remaining part (1 −
∑
j Pij)xi leaves the
network directly.
• The instantaneous inflow to cell i is a quantity between 0 and wi
• Besides the inflow from other cells, each cell i possibly receives a constant instantaneous exogenous inflow ai ≥ 0
from outside the network while a constant instantaneous outflow bi ≥ 0 is drained, if available, directly from cell
i towards the external environment. The part possibly exceeding wi is lost.
This leads to the following form for the total instantaneous net flow:
fi(x) = S
wi
0
(∑
j
Pjixj + ci
)
− xi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n , (10)
where ci = ai − bi. It is then clear that the rest points of the dynamical flow network (9)–(10) coincide with the
equilibria of the network (P,w) with exogenous flow c. In fact, as proven in [16], every solution of the dynamical flow
network (9)–(10) with initial state x(0) converges to some network equilibrium in the limit as t grows large.
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3 Structural properties of the equilibria
In this section, we assume we have fixed a sub-stochastic matrix P ∈ Rn×n+ , a nonnegative vector w ∈ R
n
+, and a
vector c ∈ Rn, and we study the equilibria of the network (P,w) with exogenous flow c, namely the solutions of the
fixed-point equation (2). We denote by
X = {x ∈ Rn : (2)}
the set of such equilibria. It is useful to introduce the complete lattice
Lw0 = {x ∈ R
n : 0 ≤ x ≤ w} , (11)
and note that the vector saturation function Sw0 : R
n → Lw0 . This implies that necessarily X ⊆ L
w
0 .
Existence of such equilibria directly follows from Brower’s fixed point theorem, since the lattice Lw0 is a nonempty,
convex, and compact set, and x 7→ Sw0 (P
′x + c) maps Lw0 in itself with continuity. Hence, we always have that the
equilibrium set X is nonempty. On the other hand, equilibria are not unique in general: e.g., in the simple network
with n = 2, Pij = |i− j| for i, j = 1, 2, w = 1, and c = 0, the equilibria are all the vectors x = (t, t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
In the analysis of the structure of X , an important role will be played by the graph underlying the matrix P ,
namely the directed graph GP = (V , E) with node set V = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and link set E = {(i, j) ∈ V × V : Pij > 0}.
The contribution of this rest of this section is threefold. First, we prove that among the equilibria there is always
a minimal one and a maximal one. Moreover, we show that such minimal and maximal equilibria both depend
monotonically on the exogenous flow vector c and that they can be computed by a natural iterative distributed
algorithm. Finally, we get to the main result of this section introducing a fundamental partition of the node set into
three subsets and prove that such partition is invariant with respect to the entire set of equilibria. Such results will
be instrumental to all derivations in the next sections.
3.1 Minimal and maximal equilibria
We start with the following simple result.
Lemma 3.1. Let w ∈ Rn+ be a nonnegative vector and let P ∈ R
n×n
+ be a nonnegative matrix. Then, the map
(x, c) 7→ Sw0 (P
′x+ c) (12)
is continuous and monotone nondecreasing from Rn × Rn to the complete lattice Lw0 ⊆ R
n.
Proof. Continuity follows immediately from the fact that (12) is the composition of the saturation function Sw0 with
the linear map (x, c) 7→ P ′x+ c. Similarly, monotonicity is implied by the fact that both those functions preserve the
natural partial ordering of Rn (this is true for the linear map beacuse P is a nonnegative matrix).
We now consider the iterative algorithm
x(t + 1) = Sw0 (P
′x(t) + c) , t ≥ 0 , (13)
whose fixed points coincide with the solutions of (2).
Proposition 3.1.1. Let X be the set of equilibria of the network (P,w) with exogenous flow vector c ∈ Rn. Let x(t)
be the sequence determined by (13) with initial condition x(0) = x0. Then,
(i) The set X admits a minimal element x and a maximal element x (in the sense of the usual entry-wise ordering
in Rn);
(ii) If x0 = 0, then x(t)→ x for t→ +∞;
(iii) If x0 = 1, then x(t)→ x for t→ +∞.
Indicating with x(c) and x(c) the minimal and maximal equilibrium as a function of the exogenous flow vector c, we
have that
(iv) c 7→ x(c) and c 7→ x(c) are monotone nondecreasing maps from Rn to Lw0 .
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Proof. For simplicity of notation, throughout the proof, we put Φ(x) = Sw0 (P
′x+ c).
Assume first that x0 = 0. In this case the sequence x(t) determined by (13) is non-decreasing and this can be shown
with an induction argument on t ≥ 0. Indeed, on the one hand, since Φ(0) ∈ Lw0 , we have that x(0) = 0 ≤ Φ(0) = x(1).
On the other hand, since Φ(x) is monotone by Lemma 3.1, we have that, if x(t) ≤ x(t + 1) for some t ≥ 0, then
x(t + 2) = Φ(x(t + 1)) ≥ Φ(x(t)) = x(t + 1). Being non-decreasing and bounded, the sequence x(t) admits limit x.
Since Φ is continuous, x = Φ(x) is necessarily a solution of (2).
We now prove by contradiction that x is minimal in X . If not, let x∗ ∈ X be such that x∗ < x. and let
t∗ = sup{t ≥ 0 : x(t) ≤ x∗}. Notice that, since x(0) = 0 ≤ x∗ and limx(t) = x, t∗ is necessarily finite and such that
x(t∗) ≤ x∗. Monotonicity of Φ implies that x(t∗ + 1) = Φ(x(t∗)) ≤ Φ(x∗) = x∗, thus contradicting the way t∗ was
defined. Therefore, x is minimal in X . This proves (ii) and the first part of (i).
A completely parallel argument shows that, with initial condition x(0) = w the iterations (13) converge to a
maximal solution x of (2). This proves (iii) and the second part of (i).
We now prove (iv). Consider two vectors c1, c2 ∈ Rn such that c1 ≤ c2 and let x1(t) and x2(t) the two sequences
determined by the iterative algorithm (13) with, respectively, c = c1 and c = c2, and with initial condition x1(0) =
x2(0) = 0. Using (ii), we obtain that the two sequences converge, respectively, to the minimal solutions x(c1) and
x(c2). Using Lemma 3.1 we can see that
x1(t) ≤ x2(t) ⇒ x1(t+ 1) = S
w
0 (P
′x1(t) + c1) ≤ S
w
0 (P
′x2(t) + c2) = x2(t+ 1) .
Since x1(0) = x2(0), by induction we have that x1(t) ≤ x2(t) for all t. This yields x(c1) ≤ x(c2). We have proven that
x(c) is monotone nondecreasing. The same property for the maximal solution x(c) follows by an equivalent argument.
Remark. Observe that the iteration (13) can be implemented as a distributed algorithm, whereby at each time t ≥ 0
each node i ∈ V using only the current states xj(t) of its in-neighbors {j ∈ V : Pji > 0} update its state according to
xi(t+ 1) = S
wi
0 (
∑
j Pjixi(t) + ci). The complexity of each iteration of (13) is therefore of the order of the number of
links in the network.
3.2 A fundamental partition
We now show that, regardless of whether the system (2) admits a unique solution or multiple ones, the node set V can
be partitioned in three subsets such that every equilibrium x has entries saturated to w, unsaturated, and, respectively,
saturated to 0 on these subsets. Remarkably, such partition can be proven to be equilibrium-invariant, a fact that
that will play a key role in the future analysis.
For every equilibrium x ∈ X , we proceed by partitioning the node set V as
V = Vx− ∪ V
x
+ ∪ V
x
0 , (14)
where:
• Vx+ =
{
i ∈ V : ci +
∑
k 6=i Pkixk > wi
}
is the set of surplus nodes;
• Vx0 =
{
i ∈ V : 0 ≤ ci +
∑
k 6=i Pkixk ≤ wi
}
is the set of exposed nodes;
• Vx− =
{
i ∈ V : ci +
∑
k 6=i Pkixk < 0
}
is the set of deficit nodes.
By the way these sets have been defined, it follows that
xi = 0 , if i ∈ V
x
−
xi = wi , if i ∈ Vx+
xi = ci +
∑
j 6=i Pjixj if i ∈ V
x
0 .
(15)
The following is the key result of this section and will be instrumental to all our future derivations.
Proposition 3.1.2. The partition (14) is invariant over all equilibria x ∈ X .
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Proof. We consider the maximal equilibrium x and any another equilibrium x and we show that they share the same
node partition (14). To begin with, notice that, since x ≥ x, we have V+x ⊇ V
x
+ and V
−
x ⊆ V
x
−. Let us split nodes in
five different classes, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, and write any vector y ∈ RV in a block form accordingly y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5)
For simplicity of notation indicate Qij := (P
′)CiCj .
The five classes of nodes correspond to the four possible cases in which x and x can differ and are precisely defined
below:
• C1 = Vx+ is the set of nodes that are surplus for both equilibria; it holds w1 = x
+
1 = x1;
• C2 = V
+
x \V
x
+ is the set of nodes that are surplus for x but not for x; it holds w2 = x2 <
∑4
k=1 Q2kxk + c2 and
x2 ≥
∑4
k=1Q2kxk + c2;
• C3 = Vx0 ∩ V
0
x is the set of nodes that are exposed for both equilibria; it holds x3 =
∑4
k=1Q3kxk + c3 and
x3 =
∑4
k=1Q3kxk + c3;
• C4 = V0x\V
x
0 is the set of nodes that are exposed for x and deficit for x; it holds x4 =
∑4
k=1Q4kxk + c4 and
x4 = 0 >
∑4
k=1 Q4kxk + c4;
• C5 = V
−
x is the set of nodes that are deficit for both equilibria; it holds x5 = x5 = 0.
For our claim to hold, we need to prove that C2 = C4 = ∅. We put ∆x = x− x ≥ 0 and we notice that, for classes
C1 and C5 we have that ∆x1 = ∆x5 = 0. For the remaining blocks we can write:

∆x2 = x2 − x2 <
∑4
k=1 Q2kxk + c2 −
∑4
k=1 P
′
k2xk − c2 =
∑4
k=2 Q2k∆xk
∆x3 = x3 − x3 =
∑4
k=1 Q3kxk + c3 −
∑4
k=1 P
′
k3xk − c3 =
∑4
k=2 Q3k∆xk
∆x4 = x4 − x4 <
∑4
k=1 Q4kxk + c4 −
∑4
k=1 P
′
k4xk − c4 =
∑4
k=2 Q4k∆xk
(16)
Since the matrix
Q =

Q22 Q23 Q24Q32 Q33 Q34
Q42 Q43 Q44

 (17)
is a sub-matrix of P ′, necessarily its transpose Q′ is sub-stochastic. By contradiction, if C2 ∪ C4 6= ∅, using (16), the
fact that ∆x2 +∆x4 > 0, and the fact that 1
′Q ≤ 1′, we obtain
1
′∆x2 + 1
′∆x3 + 1
′∆x4 < 1
′Q(′∆x2 +∆x3 +∆x4) ≤ 1
′∆x2 + 1
′∆x3 + 1
′∆x4 .
This contradiction implies that, necessarily, C2 = C4 = ∅, thus proving the result.
We gather some immediate consequences of Proposition 3.1.2 in the following result.
Corollary 3.1.1. For every network (P,w) and exogenous flow c, there exists a partition of the node set
V = V+ ∪ V0 ∪ V− , (18)
such that
(i) for every equilibrium x ∈ X
xV− = 0 , xV0 = PV0V0xV0 + cV0 , xV+ = wV+ ; (19)
(ii) for every two equilibria x(1), x(2) ∈ X ,
x
(1)
V−
= x
(2)
V−
, x
(1)
V+
= x
(2)
V+
. (20)
Corollary 3.1.1 implies that the check for uniqueness can always be restricted to those entries of the equilibria that
are in V0 and that such entries of the equilibria solve a linear system of equations. However, the outstanding difficulty
in the analysis of the equilibrium set X is that the partition (18) is not known a priori. This will be dealt with in the
following section.
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4 Uniqueness of the equilibria
In this section, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibria in a network (P,w) with
exogenous flow c. We shall first consider two fundamental special cases —when the matrix P is sub-stochastic and
out-connected (Section 4.1) and, respectively, when P is stochastic and irreducible (Section 4.2)— and then build on
them in order to state and prove the general result (Section 4.3).
4.1 The out-connected case
Consider a sub-stochastic matrix P ∈ Rn×n and let
O =
{
i ∈ V :
∑
j
Pij < 1
}
be the set of the rows of P that sum up to less than 1. The matrix P is said to be out-connected if the set O is nonempty
and globally reachable in the graph GP (i.e., from every node there is a path to a node in O). The spectrum of any
out-connected sub-stochastic matrix is contained in the open unitary disk centered in 0, as stated in the following
result, whose proof can be found, e.g., in [22].
Lemma 4.1. Let P ∈ Rn×n+ be an out-connected sub-stochastic matrix. Then, P has spectral radius strictly smaller
than 1.
By combining Proposition 3.1.2 and Lemma 4.1, we can prove the following first uniqueness result.
Proposition 4.1.1. For a network (P,w) with P sub-stochastic out-connected and for any exogenous flows c, the
equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Let x(1), x(2) ∈ X and put y = x(1) − x(2). We know from point (ii) of Corollary 3.1.1 that yi = 0 for every
i ∈ V− ∪V+. The proof is finished if V0 = ∅. Otherwise, let z ∈ RV0 and Q ∈ RV0×V0 be the restrictions of y to V0 and
of P to V0 × V0, respectively. It then follows from point (i) of Corollary 3.1.1 that z satisfies the equation z = Q′z.
By Lemma 4.1, the matrix (I −Q) is invertible and thus z = 0. We thus have that x(1) = x(2) and this completes the
proof.
4.2 The irreducible stochastic case
We now study the case when P is an irreducible stochastic matrix (i.e., the associated graph GP is strongly connected).
The following result gathers standard algebraic properties of irreducible stochastic matrices that will be instrumental
in the following derivations.
Lemma 4.2. Let P ∈ Rn×n be an irreducible stochastic matrix. Then:
(i) the matrix I − P has rank n− 1 and there exists a unique invariant probability vector π = P ′π. Moreover, such
invariant probability vector has positive entries πi > 0 for every i ∈ V;
(ii) for every zero-sum vector c ∈ Rn, the serie
ν =
1
2
∑
k≥0
(
I + P ′
2
)k
c (21)
is convergent and its limit ν satisfies ν = P ′ν + c;
(iii) any square matrix Q obtained as the restriction of P to a proper subset of nodes U ⊆ V has spectral radius
smaller than 1.
Proof. (i) This is quite standard, c.f., e.g., [23].
(ii) Let P = (I + P )/2. Then, P is stochastic irreducible and aperiodic so that the matrix series
H =
1
2
∑
k≥0
(
P
k
− 1π′
)
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is convergent. Observe that, for any zero-sum vector c, we have
H ′c = lim
t→+∞
1
2
t∑
k=0
(
(P
′
)k − π1′
)
c = lim
t→+∞
1
2
t∑
k=0
(P
′
)kc = ν .
Observe that
1
2
H +
1
2
HP = HP =
1
2
∑
k≥0
(
P
k+1
− 1π′P
)
=
1
2
∑
k≥1
(
P
k
− 1π′
)
= H −
1
2
I +
1
2
1π′ ,
so that H = HP + I − 1π′, which in turn implies that
ν = H ′c = P ′H ′c+ c− π1′c = ν + c ,
where the last equality follows since 1′c = 0. This completes the proof.
(iii) It is sufficient to apply Lemma 4.1, upon noticing that the square matrix Q obtained as the restriction of an
irreducible stochastic matrix P to any proper subset of nodes U ⊆ V is an out-connected sub-stochastic matrix.
We can now state and prove the following result giving, for irreducible networks, an explicit characterization of the
condition of non-uniqueness as well a representation of the set of equilibria.
Proposition 4.2.1. For a network (P,w) with P stochastic irreducible, and for any exogenous flow c, the set of
equilibria X contains more than one elements if and only if
∑
i ci = 0 and
min
i
{
νi
πi
}
+min
i
{
wi − νi
πi
}
> 0 , (22)
where ν and π are defined as in Lemma 4.2. Moreover, in this case, the set of equilibria is given by
X =
{
x = ν + απ : −min
i
{
νi
πi
}
≤ α ≤ min
i
{
wi − νi
πi
}}
. (23)
Proof. We first analyze the solution on Rn of the non-saturated linear system
x = P ′x+ c . (24)
Since P is in this case row-stochastic, summing up all the entries of both sides of (24) gives
1
′x = 1′P ′x+ 1′c = 1′x+ 1′c
so that, for solutions to exist, it must hold that
∑
i ci = 1
′c = 0. On the other hand, if condition
∑
i ci = 0 is satisfied,
since P is irreducible, Lemma 4.2 ensures that 1 − P has rank n − 1 and that the set of solutions of (24) coincides
with the line
H = {x = ν + απ : α ∈ R} , (25)
with the vectors ν and π defined as in Lemma 4.2 (ii) and (i), respectively.
Notice that solutions of the linear system (24) that stay in the complete lattice are automatically equilibria. In
other words,
H ∩ Lw0 ⊆ X
Observe, moreover, that H ∩ Lw0 coincides with the right-hand side of (23) and that condition (22) is equivalent to
saying that H ∩ Lw0 is a segment of strictly positive length.
We are now ready to prove the statements of the theorem.
(i) Suppose first that there are multiple equilibria, namely |X | > 1. Consider the node set partition (18) that is
common to all solutions of system (2) by Proposition 3.1.2. If V− ∪ V+ 6= ∅, since V0 is a proper subset of V ,
Lemma 4.2 (iii) guarantees that the restriction Q of P to V0 × V0 has spectral radius smaller than 1. Arguing
exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4.1.1, we then deduce that |X | = 1. This contradicts the assumption made.
Therefore, necessarily V = V0. In this case, it follows from point (i) of Corollary 3.1.1 that all equilibria are
solutions of (24), namely H ∩ Lw0 = X . By previous considerations, since this set is not empty, the condition
1
′c = 0 must hold. Moreover, |X | > 1 implies that H ∩ Lw0 must be a segment of positive length that, as
previously observed, is equivalent to condition (22).
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(ii) Suppose now that
∑
i ci = 0 and that condition (22) holds true. Then previous considerations imply that
H ∩ Lw0 ⊆ X is a segment of positive length. Non-uniqueness of equilibria is thus proven.
(iii) Finally notice that if any of the two equivalent conditions hold, then, from proof (i) we have that H ∩ Lw0 = X
and this is equivalent to representation (23).
This completes the proof.
The result above has a simple geometric interpretation in part already exploited in the proof. Assuming that∑
i ci = 0, the line H defined in (25) is the set of solutions of the non-saturated linear system (24). The non-
uniqueness condition (22) is simply the condition that this line intersects the interior part of the lattice Lw0 and the
set of equilibria in this case is the segment obtained by this intersection. The minimal and maximal equilibria are
the boundary points of this interval. We notice that the arguments used in the proof also show that in the case of
non-uniqueness, necessarily all nodes must be exposed nodes, namely V = V0.
Example:
Consider the network (P,w) where
P =

 0 0.75 0.250 0 1
0.3 0.7 0

 , w =

53
2

 .
Notice that the matrix P is stochastic and irreducible. The associated graph GP is depicted in Figure ??.
1 2
3
0.75
0.25 1
0.3 0.7
Figure 1: The network of Example 4.2
We analyze uniqueness for two possible exogenous flows
c(1) = [−1, 1, 0]′ c(2) = [−2, 2, 0]′ .
Notice first that
∑
i c
(1)
i =
∑
i c
(2)
i = 0. We now check condition (22).
Indicating with νi, for i = 1, 2, the vector defined in (21) for c = c◦ and with π the invariant probability of P , a
direct computation shows that
min
i
{
ν1i
πi
}
+min
i
{
wi − ν1i
πi
}
≈ 1.60 > 0
min
i
{
ν2i
πi
}
+min
i
{
wi − ν2i
πi
}
≈ −6.41 < 0
(26)
By Proposition 4.2.1 we deduce that for the flow c(1) there are multiple equilibria, while for the flow c(2) the
equilibrium is unique.
The structure of the equilibria is shown in Figure 2. Notice how in the first case the line H intersects the
open part of the lattice, while in the second is external. The unique equilibrium in this last case is a single point
necessarily on the boundary of the lattice as some of its entries are saturated either to 0 or to wi.
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x3
x1
x2
6
4
2
0
−2
−4
4
2
2 040
x
x
H
Lw0
(a) The network (P,w) with exogenous flow c(1) admits
multiple equilibria (the red dots and the red segment).
x3
x1
x2
6
4
2
0
−2
−4
4
2
2 040
H
Lw0
x
(b) The network (P,w) with exogenous flow c(2) admits
a unique equilibrium (the red dot).
Figure 2: Sets of equilibria for the network.
4.3 Uniqueness in the general case
We now study uniqueness of equilibria for general networks (P,w), where P is an arbitrary sub-stochastic matrix and
w an arbitrary nonnegative vector.
In order to proceed, we need to introduce some further graph-theoretic notions. Consider the graph GP = (V , E)
associated with P that, we recall, has node set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and link set E = {(i, j) ∈ V×V : Pij > 0}. A trapping
set is any nonempty subset of nodes S ⊆ V with no links pointing out of it, i.e., such that Pij = 0 for every i ∈ S and
j ∈ V \S. A trapping set is referred to as irreducible if it does not strictly contain any other trapping set. A sink node
j is a node such that {j} is a trapping set (and, as such, it is necessarily irreducible). The transient part T ⊆ V of a
graph is the subset of nodes that do not belong to any irreducible trapping set. The node set V can be partitioned as
the disjoint union
V = T ∪ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sm , (27)
of the transient part T and of the distinct irreducible trapping sets Sl for 1 ≤ l ≤ m, with 0 ≤ m ≤ n. Observe that
partition (27) is determined by the matrix P only. In the special case when GP is strongly connected, the whole node
set V is itself an irreducible trapping set, so that in this case T = ∅, m = 1, and S1 = V . See Figure 3 for an example
of a graph with a nonempty transient part T and a single trapping set S1.
T S1
Figure 3: A graph G containing an irreducible trapping set S1 and a nonempty transient part T .
The following result gives a complete analysis of the structure of the equilibria for generic networks. We recall the
standing notation assumption: if x is a vector and P is a matrix, xA, PAB denote restrictions to, respectively, the
index sets A or A× B.
Theorem 4.3. Consider a network (P,w), where P is any sub-stochastic matrix, and an exogenous flow c. Consider
the partition (27) of the node set into its transient part and its irreducible trapping sets of the graph GP . Then, the
equilibria x ∈ X split according to such partition
x = (xT , xS1 , . . . , xSm)
in such a way that
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(i) their projection xT on the transient part T is unique;
(ii) their projection xSl on a trapping set Sl that is out-connected or such that
∑
j∈Sl
(
cj +
∑
i∈T
Pijxi
)
6= 0 , (28)
is unique;
(iii) their projection xSl on a trapping set Sl that is not out-connected and such that
∑
j∈Sl
(
cj +
∑
i∈T
Pijxi
)
= 0 , (29)
is non-unique if and only if
min
i
{
ν
(l)
i
π
(l)
i
}
+min
i
{
wi − ν
(l)
i
π
(l)
i
}
> 0 , (30)
where
• π(l) = (PSlSl)
′π(l) is the unique invariant probability vector of the block PSlSl ;
• ν(l) = 12
∑
k≥0
(
I+(PSlSl )
′
2
)k
(cSl + (PT Sl)
′xT )
Moreover, in this case, the projection xSl of any equilibrium satisfies
xSl = ν
(l) + απ(l) , −min
i∈Sl
{
ν
(l)
i
π
(l)
i
}
≤ α ≤ min
i∈Sl
{
wi − ν
(l)
i
π
(l)
i
}
. (31)
Proof. First, we observe that, by the way the transient part T is defined, the projection of any equilibrium x on T
satisfies
xT = S
wT
0 ((PT T )
′xT + cT ) ,
The fact that T is the transient part implies that the matrix PT T is sub-stochastic and out-connected, so that we can
readily apply Proposition 4.1.1 to prove claim (i).
We now study separately the behavior on each trapping set Sl, for l = 1, . . . ,m observing that the relative projection
of the equilibrium x satisfies
xSl = S
wSl
0 ((PSlSl)
′xSl + (PT Sl)
′xT + cSl) ,
Claims (ii) and (iii) then follow by applying Proposition 4.2.1.
5 Continuity and the lack thereof
In this section, we study how, for a given network (P,w), the set of equilibria depends on the exogenous flow vector
c. This analysis is crucial to study the way exogenous shocks affect the network equilibrium. Indeed, recall that in
considered financial network model, we have that c = a− b− ǫ where a and b represent the vector of assets values and
liabilities towards external entities and ǫ is the vector of shock affecting the value of the assets. Thus, the resilience of
the system with respect to shocks is in the end determined by the way solutions depend on the parameter vector c.
In the following we will consider a fixed network (P,w) and a varying flow vector c and use the notation
X (c), x(c), x(c)
to denote, respectively, the set of equilibria, the maximal and the minimal equilibria of (P,w) with exogenous flow c.
Moreover, let
U = {c ∈ Rn : |X (c)| = 1} , M = Rn \ U , (32)
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be the subsets of exogenous flow vectors for which there is a unique equilibrium and, respectively, there are multiple
equilibria. For exogenous flow vectors c ∈ U , we shall also use the notation
x(c) = x(c) = x(c)
for the unique equilibrium.
The following result gives a complete picture of the behavior of the set of equilibria X (c) as a function of c. It shows
that the set M where the equilibrium is not unique is contained in the union of a finite number of linear manifolds of
co-dimension 1 in Rn, that outside of it the equilibrium x(c) is a piecewise continuous function of the exogenous flow
c that undergoes jump discontinuities when c crosses the non-uniqueness set M.
Theorem 5.1. Let (P,w) be a network. Let U andM be defined as in (32) and let m be number of irreducible trapping
sets in GP . Then,
(i) the non-uniqueness set M is the union of at most m linear sub-manifolds of co-dimension 1 in Rn;
(ii) the map c 7→ x(c) is continuous on the uniqueness set U ;
(iii) for every exogenous flow c∗ ∈M,
lim inf
c∈U
c→c∗
x(c) = x(c∗) , lim sup
c∈U
c→c∗
x(c) = x(c∗) .
Proof. (i) Consider the partition (27) of the node set of the graph GP into its transient part and its irreducible trapping
sets. It then follows from Theorem 4.3(iii) that an exogenous flow c ∈Mmust satisfy equation (29) for some irreducible
trapping set Sl. Each such condition determines a linear sub-manifold of co-dimension 1 in R
n. Therefore, we can
conclude that the set M of those exogenous flow vectors c for which the equilibria are not unique is the union of at
most m linear sub-manifolds of co-dimension 1 in Rn.
(ii) and (iii): Consider first any exogenous flow c∗ ∈ Rn and a sequence (c(k))k≥1 in R
n such that
c(k)
k→+∞
−→ c∗ , x(c(k))
k→+∞
−→ x∗ . (33)
Since
x(c(k)) = Sw0 (P
′x(c(k)) + c(k)) ,
for all k ≥ 1, passing to the limit in both sides of the above we obtain by continuity that
x∗ = Sw0 (P
′x∗ + c∗) ,
i.e., x∗ ∈ X (c∗), so that in particular
x(c∗) ≤ x∗ ≤ x(c∗) . (34)
The arbitrariness of the sequence (c(k))k satisfying (33) and (34) imply that
lim inf
c∈U
c→c∗
x(c) ≥ x(c∗) (35)
Consider now c(k) = c∗−1/k1. A continuity argument shows that for those trapping sets for which condition (28) holds
true with c = c∗, it continues to hold true with c = c(k) for sufficiently large k. On the other hand, for those trapping
sets for which condition (29) holds true for c = c∗, condition (28) holds true instead for c = c(k) and sufficiently large
k. This says that, independently from c∗, c(k) ∈ U for sufficiently large k. It then follows from Proposition 3.1.1 (iv)
that, since c(k)
k→+∞
−→ c∗ and c(k) ≤ c∗ for every k ≥ 1,
x(c(k)) = x(c(k))c(k)
k→+∞
−→ x∗ ≤ x(c∗) .
By combining the above with (35) we deduce that
lim inf
c∈U
c→c∗
x(c) = x(c∗) (36)
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A completely analogous argument allows one to prove that
lim sup
c∈U
c→c∗
x(c) = x(c∗) (37)
Now, in case that c∗ ∈ U , we have that x(c∗) = x(c∗) and then relations (36) and (37) together yield (ii). In case
instead that c∗ ∈ M, relations (36) and (37) together prove (iii).
We finally characterize the size of the maximum jump x(c∗)− x(c∗).
Corollary 5.1.1. Let (P,w) be a network. Consider the partition (27) of the node set into its transient part T and its
irreducible trapping sets Sl for l = 1, . . . ,m. For each l, let π(l) be the invariant probability vector of the block PSlSl .
Then, the maximal norm of a jump discontinuity in the equilibrium is given by
max
c∈Rn
‖x(c)− x(c)‖pp =
∑
1≤l≤m
(
min
i∈Sl
wi
π
(l)
i
)p
‖π(l)‖pp , (38)
Proof. First observe that, for every c ∈ Rn, Theorem 4.3 guarantees that there exist scalars αl such that
(x(c))T − (x(c))T = 0 , (x(c))Sl − (x(c))Sl = αlπ
(l) , (39)
for 1 ≤ l ≤ m. Now, observe that 0 ≤ xi(c) − xi(c) ≤ wi for every i ∈ V , so that 0 ≤ αlπ
(l)
i ≤ wi for every i ∈ Sl,
which in turn implies that
0 ≤ αl ≤ min
i∈Sl
wi
π
(l)
i
, (40)
for 1 ≤ l ≤ m. It then follows from (39) and (40) that
‖x(c)− x(c)‖pp ≤
∑
1≤l≤m
(
min
i∈Sl
wi
π
(l)
i
)p
‖π(l)‖pp ,
for every c ∈ Rn.
It remains to prove equality in (38). For this, consider c = 0 and notice that, since 0 ∈ X (0), then x(0) = 0. Notice
now that on each irreducible trapping set Sl, the non-uniqueness conditions (29) and (30) of Theorem 4.3 hold true
(since ν(l) = 0) and it follows from expression (31) that
(x(0))Sl = mini∈Sl
wi
π
(l)
i
π(l)
Therefore,
‖x(0)− x(0)‖pp =
∑
1≤l≤m
(
min
i∈Sl
wi
π
(l)
i
)p
‖π(l)‖pp ,
thus completing the proof.
We conclude this section with the following example.
Example:
In this example we will show how the jump discontinuity that occurs when the exogenous flow c crosses the critical
set M can be interpreted in the context of financial networks. For sake of simplicity, we will consider a strongly
connected graph, but the analysis can be carried on in the general case.
To measure the aggregated effect of a shock on a network, it is useful to introduce a risk measure known as
systemic loss as defined in [21]. Let c◦ an arbitrary exogenous flow for which all nodes in the financial network are
fully liable, i.e., such that x(c◦) = w, and let c ≤ c◦ be the exogenous flow after a shock. Then, define the systemic
loss as the aggregated difference between the net worth of the nodes before the shock, i.e., v◦ = P ′w + c◦ − w, and
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their net worth after the shock, i.e. v = P ′x(c) + c− w. Observe that
l (c◦, c) = 1′ (v◦ − v) = 1′ (P ′w + c◦ − w − (P ′x(c) + c− w)) = 1′c◦ − 1′c+ 1′w − 1′x(c) . (41)
In the rightmost side of the above, the term (1′c◦ − 1′c) represents the direct loss inflicted by the shock, while
(1′w − 1′x(c)), called the shortfall term, represents the indirect loss triggered by reduced payments.
Let us now compute the size of the jump of the loss function when the exogenous flow c crosses the critical
region M. By using the representation of solutions derived in Proposition 4.2.1, we obtain that for every c∗ ∈ M,
the jump in the loss is given by
∆l (c∗) = lim inf
c∈U
c→c∗
l (c◦, c)− lim sup
c∈U
c→c∗
l (c◦, c) = 1′ (x (c∗)− x (c∗))
= 1′
(
ν +min
i
{
wi − νi
πi
}
π − ν +min
i
{
νi
πi
}
π
)
= min
i
{
νi
πi
}
+min
i
{
wi − νi
πi
}
.
(42)
Let us consider again the network of Example 4.2 (Figure 1) and compute how the loss function varies when an
exogenous shock of magnitude ǫ ∈ [0, 14] hits the network. Specifically, let us consider an initial vector c◦ = [5, 2, 2]′
and an exogenous shock c such that:
c = c◦ − ǫq, q =

0.070.59
0.34

 , ǫ ∈ [0, 14].
Notice that we have decided to perturb the vector c◦ along the particular direction q; such q can be interpreted as
a normalized vector collecting the sensibilities of nodes with respect to the shock magnitude ǫ.
The jump discontinuity must happen when uniqueness conditions fail to hold, which, by Proposition 4.2.1, means
that first of all it must be 1′c = 0 =⇒ ǫ = 9, which gives us a candidate critical vector c∗ = [4.4,−3.3,−1.1]′. For
such c∗, a direct computation shows that mini
{
νi
pii
}
+mini
{
wi−νi
pii
}
≈ 14.6 > 0, which implies that c∗ ∈ M. Let
us plot the loss function and the solution vector x as functions of ǫ in Fig. 4.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
5
10
15
20
25
ǫ
l(ǫ)
0
9
(a) Loss as a function of ǫ. We can see the jump disconti-
nuity at ǫ = 9.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
1
w3 =2
w2 =3
4
w1 =5
ǫ
x(ǫ)
0
9
Node failure
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
(b) Solution vector as a function of ǫ. We can see the jump
discontinuity at ǫ = 9, which brings node 1 and 3 to default.
Figure 4: test
Figure 4 (a) shows how the loss function varies piece-wise linearly until ǫ = 9, where it undergoes the jump
discontinuity. The size of the jump can be computed using (42)
∆l(c∗) = min
i
{
νi
πi
}
+min
i
{
wi − νi
πi
}
≈ 14.6. (43)
– 16 –
Equilibria and Systemic Risk in Saturated Networks L.Massai, G.Como, F.Fagnani
It is particularly useful also to plot the solution vector x as a function of ǫ (Figure 4 (b)); we can notice that all
nodes are solvent for ǫ < 6.5 while for ǫ ≈ 6.5 node 2 goes bankrupt as its outflow falls below w2 = 3. As the shock
magnitude increases, we reach the discontinuity point at ǫ = 9 where the network suffers a dramatic crisis as node
1 and 3 suddenly default. Notice in particular how node 3 goes from fully solvent (x3 = w3) to completely insolvent
(x3 = 0) around ǫ = 9.
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed network equilibria modeled as the solutions of a linear fixed point equation with a saturation
inequality. Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness and a general expression describing all such equilibria
for a general network have been proved. Finally, the dependence of the network equilibria on the exogenous flows in
the network has been studied highlighting the existence of jump discontinuities. This model was first considered to
determining clearing payments in the context of networked financial institutions interconnected by obligations and it
is one of the simplest continuous model where shock propagation phenomena and cascading failure effects may occur.
Our results contribute to an in-depth analysis of such phenomena.
The understanding of the extent to which the network topology determines the structure of the solutions as well
the possibility of these cascading effects to occur is still not sufficiently understood. As a future project, we aim at
studying this for random networks with prescribed degree distributions.
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